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Abstract
The paper discusses the question of the abi-
lity of the two-part transfer pricing system to 
stimulate investment centers to reject projects 
with positive NPV and to accept projects with 
negative NPV when there is no external market 
for intermediate products. The study revealed 
under which circumstances investment centers 
can take such dysfunctional decisions and it in-
vestigated if these systems can be modified to 
eliminate negative effects of such circumstances. 
In order to solve these problems, methods of fi-
nancial analysis, real options theory and theory 
of constraints were used and several hypothetical 
business situations were modelled to exemplify 
possible dysfunctional behavior of investment 
centers when strategic decisions are taken in a 
decentralized manner. The paper considers the 
reasons for taking such decisions, such as using 
average rates of resource costs in calculating the 
transfer payment, presence of the real options in 
related projects complex and breaking the five 
focusing steps of the theory of constraints. 
Keywords: transfer price; two-part tran-
sfer pricing system; decentralization; investment 
center; economic profit; real option; theory of 
constraints
1. INTRODUCTION
In cases of high decentralization where
the structure of the company includes profit 
centers and investment centers, the duties 
of transfer pricing must be given to their 
managers. It is usually accepted that del-
egating broad authorities to units and crea-
tion of such centers can increase the qual-
ity and speed of decision making, as well as 
enhance staff motivation (Horngren et al., 
1997). At the same time, in the absence of 
a competitive external market, the establish-
ment of transfer pricing on a cost basis by 
representatives of profit centers and invest-
ment centers can lead to decisions that are 
not optimal for the company as a whole.
Setting the cost-based transfer price for 
a unit of an intermediate product usually 
does not allow adequate inclusion into the 
price of the long-term marginal produc-
tion costs or the opportunity costs that arise 
when there are several options for using 
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limited resources from a unit producing in-
termediate products. Therefore, decision-
making by profit centers and investment 
centers based on such prices can lead to 
losses and lost profits. These losses and lost 
profits are an intrafirm analogue of transac-
tion costs introduced in the economics by 
Coase (1937) and subsequently investigated 
by Williamson (1985).
The works of Hirshleifer (1956) and 
Bierman (1959) may be considered first 
significant studies of this problem. A large 
contribution to the investigation of cost-
based transfer pricing methods was made 
by Samuels (1969). The results of his re-
search were further developed by Tomkins 
(1990) who combined full costs based pric-
ing with negotiations between responsi-
bility centers in the pragmatic-analytical 
approach. Transfer pricing based on activ-
ity-based costing was proposed by Kaplan 
and Atkinson (1998). This problem was 
also investigated by Vaysman (1996), Gox 
(2000), McAulaya et al. (2001), Sahay 
(2003), Buus and Brada (2008), Luther and 
Zverovich (2010), Pfeiffer et al. (2011). 
However, most of the solutions proposed by 
these authors are either too complicated for 
implementation or are associated with gen-
eral shortcomings in absorption costing, ex-
plicated in particular by the founders of the 
theory of constraints (Goldratt, 1990).
In this regard, transfer pricing system 
consisting of two parts forming in total the 
equivalent to the long-term marginal cost 
of the transferring unit, deserves special 
attention. The use of two-part prices in the 
economy is quite common and has been an-
alyzed by a number of authors (e.g. Hayes, 
1987; Schlereth et al., 2010). The use of 
two-part prices in transfer pricing to solve 
the problem of double monopoly margin 
was investigated by Lantz (2009) and the 
use of this system in the service sector by 
Young (1998).
At the same time, the features of this 
transfer pricing system application in the 
investment centers’ activities have not been 
fully studied. It is known that the funda-
mental criterion for evaluation of invest-
ment decisions is the net present value 
(NPV) for a set of related projects. It can be 
assumed that in some situations, this trans-
fer pricing system may prompt investment 
center managers to reject projects with a 
positive NPV or to accept projects with a 
negative NPV.
That is why to minimize such alterna-
tive costs resulting from application of this 
transfer pricing system, two tasks must be 
solved. Firstly, circumstances should be de-
termined when using this transfer pricing 
system can lead to a fall in business’ value. 
Secondly, the possibility of modifying this 
system to eliminate the negative effects of 
these circumstances should be determined. 
2. METHODOLOGY AND
MATERIALS
In order to solve the presented prob-
lems, let us simulate three hypothetical 
business situations of a company which 
consists of three major production divisions 
(Figure 1). Division X is a profit center and 
produces intermediate products, which are 
used by divisions and investment centers 
Y and Z to produce end products A and B, 
respectively. There are no external markets 
for the intermediate products while the mar-
kets for both end products are close to the 
market of perfect competition, which allows 
us to consider the company as a price taker. 
The products A and B are neither substi-
tutes, nor complementary.
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Figure 1. Activity of the company with two-part transfer pricing system and no external markets for 
intermediate products
In order to evaluate the costs of transac-
tions between centers X and Y, as well as 
centers X and Z, let us accept the simplest 
version of a two-part transfer pricing sys-
tem, since building models based on more 
complex distribution systems of indirect 
costs, in particular ABC, would signifi-
cantly complicate them, without changing 
the nature of the problem. In our case, the 





where iP  is the expenditure on transfer
operations of the i-th division, including iV
- expenses on reimbursement of the variable 
costs of division X related to the intermedi-
ate products manufacturing, iC  is the value 
of the right to use its production capacity;
qji is the output of the j-th end product 
by the i-th division (we shall accept it as 
equal to sales);
vcjxis the standard variable costs of divi-
sion X per output of a unit of the j-th end 
product;
rjx is the time rate spent on the output 
of intermediate products by division X re-
quired for the manufacturing of a unit of the 
j-th end product;
cpix is the part of the production capacity 
of division X reserved for the i-th customer-
division (in machine-hours);
sx is the rate of one machine-hour of  di-
vision X;
cpx is the production capacity of divi-
sion X (in machine-hours);
FCx is the total estimated fixed costs of 
division X assuming that the equipment of 
this division operates at full capacity (ex-
cept for the depreciation of the fixed assets 
of division X);
DPxis the depreciation of the fixed assets 
of division X;
Ax is the assets of division X, for which 
normal profit, i.e. the profit required to 
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reimburse the costs of capital, is calculated 
by the rate k corresponding to the cost of 
capital.
In accordance with the conditions of 
decentralization, the manager of division 
X can distribute the production capacities 
between the consumer divisions through 
negotiations. It should be noted that it does 
not exclude the possibility of redistributing 
the rights to the production capacities of di-
vision X between divisions Y and Z using 
an in-house analogue of the secondary mar-
ket of these rights. If the participants have 
full access to the information in such a mar-
ket, these rights could be acquired by the 
division that is able to use them in the most 
effective way and, as a result, could offer 
the highest price.
In order to simplify the calculations, 
let us presume that for any option, all fac-
tors of future operation cash flows, in par-
ticular the demand for products, prices and 
cost rates, remain unchanged on the plan-
ning horizon. That is why, future cash flows 
from operating activities can be modeled as 
annuities. The data on available production 
capacities, standard fixed costs and normal 
profits of the divisions for the planning 
month are given in Table 1. On that prem-
ise, the rate of one machine hour, which is 
used to charge for the capacity maintained 
at the current level, according to (2) is ap-
proximately 2.8 thousand rubles. The rates 
of direct variable costs and equipment op-
erating time costs for the manufacturing of 
end products are given in Table 2.
Table 1. Data on production capacities, fixed costs and normal profits of the company’s divisions for 
the planning month
Division (i) Production capacity, machine-hours (cpi)
Fixed costs, apart from depreciation 
and expenses for transfer operations, 
thousand rubles (FCi)
Depreciation and normal profit, 
thousand rubles (DPi+Ai · k)
X 2 100 3 041 2 839
Y 1 380 1 176 723
Z 1 350 1 065 571
Table 2. Rates of direct variable costs and machine time for output of end products of the company on 
the planning horizon 
Product (j)
The rate of variable costs for the manufacturing of 
a unit of the end product in divisions, rubles (vcji)
The running time of equipment required 
for the manufacturing of the end product 
in the divisions, machine-hours / thousand 
units (rji)
X Y Z X Y Z
A 25.00 15.00 6.40 11.00
B 40.00 20.00 9.00 8.50
The enterprise has one project for ex-
panding production capacities in each di-
vision, with details presented in Table 3. 
If necessary, these projects can be carried 
out independently of each other. In order 
to simplify the calculations, let us suppose 
that the time needed for the purchase and 
installation of additional equipment for 
each of these projects is negligible and the 
projects will begin to produce an effect 
within the first month after they get adopt-
ed. Moreover, the period of use of the main 
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technological equipment for each of these 
projects until the next major investment is 
the same and equals to 10 years, which we 
will consider as the planning horizon (t).
Table 3. Data on the starting investments and change in the fixed costs for the projects aimed at expand-
ing the production capacity of divisions
No. Indicator 
The project aimed at expanding the produc-
tion capacity of the division:
X Y Z
1
Increase in the production capacity of the division, 
machine-hours per month ( icp∆ p)
700 690 680
2 Starting investments, thousand rubles ( iA∆ i)
29 800 13 200 5 300
3
Increase in the fixed costs of the division after the 
project gets adopted (excluding depreciation of fixed 
assets), thousand rubles per month ( iFC∆FCi)
1 040 580 540
The main differences between the situa-
tions to be analyzed below are (i) the con-
ditions at the end product market, (ii) the 
capacity quotas of division X that divisions 
Y and Z have in accordance with the agree-
ments reached earlier between them, and 
(iii) approaches used to evaluate the rate of 
a machine-hour (Table 4).
The difference between situation 2 
and other situations is the option to create 
the production of new product D, which 
has been developed by the head office and 
can be launched on the market in 1 year 
in case it is in demand. Through organiza-
tional means production of the new product 
can be allocated to a new division with the 
status of a profit center. Some components 
necessary for the output of this new product 
can be made only using the equipment of 
division X. The standard operating time of 
this division is 1.9 machine-hours for one 
thousand of such components. For ultimate 
simplification, we shall assume that the de-
mand and the price of the new product, as 
well as the costs for its manufacturing, will 
be stable for nine years after its possible 
launch on the market 1 year later. At the 
moment, demand and price cannot be deter-
mined accurately enough. However, starting 
from the second year and according to pre-
liminary estimates, customers will be ready 
to buy 65 thousand units of this product 
every month from the company at a price 
of 109 rubles per unit. The expected direct 
variable costs required in division X to 
manufacture intermediate products neces-
sary for manufacturing one unit of product 
D are 14 rubles, while other variable costs 
necessary for manufacturing a unit of this 
product are 32 rubles. The fixed operation 
costs of the new division (except for the de-
preciation of fixed assets) is 2,185,000 ru-
bles per month, and the starting investments 
in the assets of this division is 81,080,000 
rubles. The capital cost rate and the mean 
square deviation of the rate of return for this 
project are assumed at the same level as for 
the company as a whole.
Journal of Contemporary Management Issues
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Table 4. Differences in business situations
Distinctive feature Situation 1 Situation 2 Situation 3
Demand for the products of the company, thousand 
units per month (qDj)
A 125 125 170
B 210 202 150
Prices of products, rubles per unit (Pj)
A 80 80 90,5
B 96 96 96
Part of the capacity of division X reserved by other 
divisions, machine-hours per month (CPiX)
Y 800 800 750
Z 1300 1300 1350
Maximum output of products based on the capacity 
quota of division X, thousand units per month (qPj)
A 125 125 117.2
B 144 144 150
Method of estimating one machine-hour of operation of 










In order to learn about dysfunctional be-
havior of the managers of some investment 
centers, let us try to anticipate their possi-
ble decisions in these conditions. Let us as-
sume that the performance of these centers 
is regularly assessed based on the economic 
profit, whose best-known indicator is eco-
nomic value added (EVA). Therefore, when 
the managers of the investment centers 
make decisions, they are guided by the fore-
casted value of this indicator. So in order to 
solve the tasks posed, it is necessary to cal-
culate the shift in economic profit due to the 
project carried out by the investment center, 
for each situation. Next, NPV has to be cal-
culated for the project or set of projects for 
each situation. After that, firstly, we should 
analyze if the conclusions obtained on the 
basis of the projected economic profit are 
consistent with the NPV-based conclusions. 
Secondly, it should be assessed whether the 
NPV itself was overestimated or underes-
timated in relation to the value that would 
have been obtained for the project or a set 
of projects if investment decisions had been 
taken in the company in a centralized way.
It is known that conclusions based on 
economic profit in some cases may contra-
dict conclusions based on the rule of NPV. 
This problem is solved by obtaining the 
series of economic profit values within the 
planning horizon having the sign not oppo-
site to that of NPV with the present value 
in total equal to NPV. (Tomkins, 1975). The 
particular solution is provided by the annu-
ity method of depreciation, which allows 
obtaining the following monthly economic 




Future cash flows from the investment 
project or a set of projects, initiated by the 
i-th investment center, can be estimated as 
follows:
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(6)
Based on this, the results of the project 
evaluated by the i-th investment center in 
terms of economic profit indicator may be 
inconsistent with the NPV criterion in case 
the following equality is broken:
(7)
G is the value of the real option associ-
ated with a set of projects.
It can be seen from formulas (4) and (6) 
that we abstracted from the factors of taxa-
tion and cross-border movement of profits 
in our calculations. This is done to evalu-
ate purely the managerial consequences of 
the overall result of the company’s work 
redistributed between the divisions through 
transfer pricing. Otherwise, these factors 
could distort the results of the study and re-
quire centralized intervention in the opera-
tions of the head office.
In addition, when calculating the NPV 
of these projects, we proceed from the as-
sumption that future cash flows are random 
variables with a symmetric distribution. 
Therefore, their median value can be taken 
as the basis of the discounted cash flow. It 
will have to be determined by the above 
algorithm. Discounting is carried out at an 
annual rate of 20.9% with a monthly ac-
crual (i.e. 1.74% per month), while the an-
nual risk-free interest rate is 3% (i.e. 0.25% 
per month). The mean square deviation of 
the monthly yield on similar assets on the 
financial market is assumed to be 0.1443. 
The terminal value of the projects is set to 
be zero.
3. RESULTS
Let us consider the main options for the
development of each of the three situations 
and their results.
In situation 1, the manager of division 
Z expects an increase in demand for prod-
uct B and is considering the possibility of 
expanding the production capacity nec-
essary for the output of the product in the 
quantities that customers need. According 
to the terms of the arrangements exist-
ing between the managers of the divisions, 
by the time the decision is taken, divi-
sion Z have reserved 1300 machine-hours 
of operation of the equipment of division 
X, and division Y have reserved 800 ma-
chine-hours. Taking into account the data 
in Tables 1 and 2, with the given capacity 
quotas of division X, divisions Y and Z can 
produce 125 thousand and 144.44 thousand 
units of product A and product B respec-
tively, which is the best production program 
considering the production capacities the 
company has. 
To increase the monthly output of prod-
uct B by 65.56 thousand units, division Z, 
first of all, needs to increase its quota in the 
production capacity of division X. Since 
unit Y has no incentives to transfer part of 
its quota, in order to increase the output 
of product B, the manager of division Z 
will have to initiate a purchase of an addi-
tional piece of equipment in division X by 
the head office for 29,800 thousand rubles. 
It will increase its capacity from 2,100 to 
2,800 machine-hours per month. In addi-
tion, he will have to buy an additional piece 
of equipment at 5,300 thousand rubles for 
his own division Z, increasing its produc-
tion capacity from 1,350 to 2,030 machine-
hours per month.
Since investments in the equipment 
of divisions X and Z can bring return to 
Journal of Contemporary Management Issues
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division Z only if the implementation is 
joint they form a single set of investments. 
This set of projects has a positive NPV 
and makes the economic profit of the com-
pany grow, as can be seen from column 3 
of Table 5. Nevertheless, an increase in the 
economic profit of the company after the 
project is adopted in situation No. 1 will not 
make this indicator grow for division Z.
The fact is that the transfer charge for 
using the capacity of division X is based 
on distribution of indirect costs of this divi-
sion. In this situation it is calculated from 
the average rate of a machine-hour, which 
will decrease from 2.8 thousand rubles to 
2.683 thousand rubles per machine-hour. 
In this case, the marginal rate of a machine-
hour for the newly commissioned equip-
ment in this division will be approximately 
2.333 thousand rubles. Thus, in the case di-
visions Y and Z are charged for the capacity 
at the new average rate of a machine-hour, 
the part of saving due the cost reduction 
calculated per one machine hour in the 
amount of 93.3 thousand rubles will be re-
distributed from division Z in favor of divi-
sion Y, which will make equality (7) break. 
The result of this redistribution formally 
has the following form:
) = 800 ⋅ (2,683−2,8) ≈ −93.3( 01 −⋅=∆ XXYXY sscpC
As a result, in case production is ex-
panded, the economic profit indicator for 
division Y will increase by 93.3 thousand 
rubles per month while the value of this in-
dicator for division Z will go down by 12.2 
thousand rubles per month. Therefore, un-
der such conditions the manager of division 
Z is likely to reject this complex of invest-
ment projects, despite his positive NPV.
In order to eliminate the distorting effect 
caused by estimating the cost of additional 
machine time at average rates and to ensure 
that equality (7) is fulfilled in the following 






Situation 2 is similar to situation 1 
with the exception of three distinctions. 
The first distinction is in charging the addi-
tional transfer fee, not according to the av-
erage, but according to the marginal rate of 
a machine-hour. The second distinction is 
the assumption about the lower demand for 
product B. In this regard, additional sales of 
product B, which the manager of division Z 
can expect due to the removal of constraint 
on the production capacity of his own divi-
sion and division X, are only 57.56 thou-
sand units per month. Column 4 of Table 
5 shows that the set of projects will have a 
negative net present value of -10392 thou-
sand rubles, which will result in a decrease 
in the economic profit of division Z and the 
entire company by 206.9 thousand rubles a 
month.
Nevertheless, there is a third circum-
stance that is not directly related to the on-
going operation of division Z. It lies in the 
possibility of manufacturing new product D 
if there are enough free production capaci-
ties in division X to make the required com-
ponents. The problem is that the capacities 
of division X that exist today are going to 
be engaged in the manufacturing of inter-
mediate products for divisions Y and Z in 
the future. So the possibility of launching 
this project cannot be considered without 
making provision for expanding the produc-
tion capacity of division X. The expansion 
of the capacity of division X from 2100 to 
2800 machine-hours a month is an example 
of such expansion that would make it possi-
ble to manufacture product D in the quanti-
ties required. In this regard, measures aimed 
at expanding the production of X and Z, 
as well as the possibility of manufacturing 
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product D should be evaluated as a single 
complex.
Though the current value of the project 
aimed at creating production of product D 
amounts to 75394 thousand rubles (which 
is less than the start-up costs for this project 
discounted at a risk-free rate), we have to 
take into account that in a year the market 
situation for this project may improve, and 
its present value may increase. Thus, it is 
necessary to consider not its current value 
but the value of the possibility of creating 
this production when the conditions of the 
potential market for product D improve, 
in other words, the value of the option of 
creating a new business segment. In our 
case, we have an analogue of the European 
“out-of-the-money” call option with the 
current value of the underlying asset of 
75,394 thousand rubles, the strike price of 
81,080 thousand rubles and the period of 12 
months. The month-to-month risk-free rate 
is 0.25%, and the standard deviation of the 
monthly yield on similar assets on the fi-
nancial market is 0.1443. Hence the value 
of this option by the Black Scholes formula 
is 13,614 thousand rubles.
Table 5. Indicators of the projects aimed at expanding production in divisions X, Y and Z in situations 
1-3, thousand rubles
No. Indicator name Situation 1














take in the 
identifica-




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
10
Starting investments 
for the purchasing and 
assembly of additional 
equipment, including:
35 100.0 35 100.0 21 486.0 43 000.0 43 000.0 13 200.0
11 in division X 29 800.0 29 800.0 16 186.0 29 800.0 29 800.0 0.0
12 in division Y - - - 13 200.0 13 200.0 13 200.0
13 in division Z 5 300.0 5 300.0 5 300.0 - - -
20
Increase in monthly 
fixed costs (apart 
from depreciation), 
including:
1 580.0 1 580.0 1 580.0 1 620.0 1 620.0 580.0
21 in division X 1 040.0 1 040.0 1 040.0 1 040.0 1 040.0 0.0
22 in division Y - - - 580.0 580.0 580.0
23 in division Z 540.0 540.0 540.0 - - -
30
Marginal profit from 
increase in monthly 
sales, including:
2 360.0 2 072.0 2 072.0 2 666.9 2 461.5 1 109.3
31 product A - - - 2 666.9 2 249.8 2 249.8
32 product B 2 360.0 2 072.0 2 072.0 0.0 211.7 -1 140.5
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40
Monthly net operation 
cash flow on the 
project
780.0 492.0 492.0 1 046.9 841.5 529.3
50
Monthly annuity 
payment to reimburse 
investments 
(depreciation + normal 
profit), including:
698.9 698.9 427.8 856.2 856.2 262.8
51 in division X 593.4 593.4 322.3 593.4 593.4 0.0
52 in division Y - - - 262.8 262.8 262.8
53 in division Z 105.5 105.5 105.5 - - -
60
Increase in monthly 
economic profit of 
the company after 
acceptance of a set of 
projects
81.1 -206.9 64.2 190.7 -14.8 266.4
70 Net present value of a set of projects 4 071.2 -10 392.0 3 222.0 9 575.1 -742.5 13 380.9
Adding the value of the option of creat-
ing production of new product D (13,614 
thousand rubles) to the NPV of the set of 
projects aimed at expanding production 
in divisions X and Z (-10,392 thousand 
rubles), we get a positive value of the ad-
justed NPV (3,222 thousand rubles). This 
indicates the advisability of launching pro-
jects in divisions X and Z. However, since 
this option is not included in the area of re-
sponsibility of the manager of division Z, 
equality (7) will be broken, and he will not 
initiate the project on expanding the manu-
facturing of product B. Since its deviation 
now can lead to a loss of the market share 
of product B in the future and can make 
launching product D on the market unrea-
sonable even if the conditions are favorable, 
this can lead to lost profits for the company.
In order to get rid of the identified rea-
son for dysfunctional behavior of the man-
ager of division Z and to reestablish equal-
ity (7), investments in division X should be 
reduced by the value of the option associ-
ated with them, as shown in column 5 of 
Table 5:
In situation 3, the manager of division 
Y, who expects that the demand for product 
A will grow, is considering the possibility 
of expanding the production capacity nec-
essary for making this product in quantities 
required by customers. According to the 
arrangements between the managers of di-
visions, division Z has reserved 1,350 ma-
chine-hours of operation for the equipment 
of division X while division Y has reserved 
750 machine-hours. Given the data in 
Tables 1 and 2, with these quotas, division 
Z will be able to make product B in quanti-
ties necessary for customers while division 
Y will be able to manufacture only 117.19 
thousand units of product A.
In order to boost the output of product 
A, division Y, first of all, has to increase its 
quota for the capacity of division X to at 
least 1,088 machine-hours, and at the same 
time to increase the capacity of its own 
division from a minimum of 1,375 up to 
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1,870 machine-hours. In case the projects 
are accepted, the capacity of division Y will 
grow up to 2,070 machine-hours while its 
quota of the capacity of division X will go 
up to 1,450 machine-hours.
Let us assume initially that when we 
estimate the growth in cash flows related 
to the projects carried out by the manager 
of center Y, the base is the production pro-
gram, designed with its current quota for 
the capacity of division X (1,350 machine-
hours) and allowing to manufacture 117.19 
thousand units of product A a month. With 
this base, we get a positive NPV and an in-
crease in the economic profit of division Y 
(See column 6 of Table 5). As a result, its 
manager is likely to initiate these projects.
However, it can be easily shown that 
the production program, taken as the base 
for calculating the cash flows of the pro-
ject, does not allow the best use of the key 
limited resource of the economic system. If 
there is no change, the production capacity 
of division X is going to be such a resource, 
while the product whose sales provide the 
highest marginal profit from a machine-
hour of operation of its equipment will be 
product A (7.89 thousand rubles per ma-
chine-hour versus 4.00 thousand rubles per 
machine-hour for product B). So to use the 
bottleneck of the company in the best way 
possible, 125.45 thousand units of product 
A and 144.12 thousand units of product B 
should be made. If such an optimal plan is 
used as the base for estimating cash flows, 
we get a negative NPV of the set of pro-
jects and a decrease in the economic profit 
of division Y in the future (see column 7 
of Table 5). Thus, since the base is under-
estimated if a two-part transfer pricing sys-
tem is used, the company could adopt a set 
of projects that would reduce its value and 
economic profit.
Nevertheless, even if such an optimal 
plan was used as a basis for calculations, it 
would not exclude another mistake, namely 
rejecting all possible investments from this 
complex by the manager of division Y. The 
fact is that when you accomplish a program 
that optimally uses the available resources 
of division X, the main obstacle preventing 
the sales of product A from growing will 
be the available production capacity of di-
vision Y. So, the next measure to be evalu-
ated in the chain of improvements of the 
organization’s work should be the expan-
sion of production capacity of division Y 
from 1,380 to 2,070 machine-hours, which, 
in fact, does not yet imply the expansion of 
production capacity of division X. This can 
be explained by the fact that if the capac-
ity of division Y was expanded, the output 
of product A could be increased up to 170 
thousand units, also because the output of 
less profitable product B could decrease to 
112.44 thousand units. The results of such 
changes are presented in column 8 of Table 
5 and they show that this particular chain of 
actions complies with the rule of five focus-
ing steps in the theory of constraints (TOC) 
(Dettmer, 1997; Corbett, 1998) and could 
lead to the greatest improvement in the per-
formance of the company in the future.
4. CONCLUSION AND 
DISCUSSION
According to the results of the research 
study, it can be concluded that there a1re 
at least three circumstances that entail a 
risk of dysfunctional behavior of the man-
agers of investment centers when they ap-
ply a two-part transfer pricing system. The 
first circumstance is that the expected val-
ues of the economic profit of the division 
that makes a decision to invest money are 
distorted because the transfer fee is esti-
mated in management accounting systems 
Journal of Contemporary Management Issues
302
at average rates of the cost of resources, in 
particular that of the machine time of the di-
vision manufacturing the intermediate prod-
ucts. This can result in redistributing the ex-
pected increase in economic profit between 
several divisions – consumers of interme-
diate products and cause underestimation 
of the economic profit of the division that 
initiates the investment project as shown in 
situation 1.
The problem in situation 1 could be 
solved if the transfer fee for the use of 
newly commissioned capacities is calcu-
lated not at average but at marginal rates 
of machine time. This would allow us to 
attribute additional current and capital ex-
penses for the entire set of projects directly 
to the center – the initiator of these invest-
ments, regardless of the actual place where 
they arise. Nevertheless, using average 
rates, despite the difficulty in attributing 
additional costs directly to marginal rates 
in management accounting, has some ra-
tional grounds. Indeed, if additional units of 
equipment can be installed on the produc-
tion floor, it means that at the time when the 
decision was being made the company had 
an option to expand it. Maintaining such 
an option could entail an increased level of 
costs calculated as machine-hours of opera-
tion of the equipment of the division manu-
facturing intermediate products. Before the 
production was expanded, all the divisions 
that consumed intermediate products had 
the burden of this option, so now they all, 
rather than just the project initiator, have 
the right to receive some saving from the 
project.
Thus, there is a paradox in this transfer 
pricing system, which represents something 
more than the convenience of using aver-
age rates in accounting calculations. In its 
essence, it is associated with an attempt to 
represent a complex system in management 
accounting as a number of simple parts.
The second circumstance is that the di-
visions analyzing the effectiveness of the 
investments they initiate are likely to limit 
themselves to evaluating the consequences 
directly related to their area of responsibili-
ty. In this regard, they will not consider real 
options related to the project in other seg-
ments of the company as shown in situation 
2.
This problem could be solved if invest-
ments into the project equal to the amount 
of the option value are subsidized by the 
head office of the company, which would 
allow the initiator to predict an increase in 
economic profit. However, in order to bring 
about the question of subsidies, initiator Z 
needs to have information about the option. 
The lack of such information can result 
in project being rejected even before it is 
agreed on with the head office of the com-
pany. Therefore, the lack of information on 
such options at investment centers can be-
come one of the main constraints of such 
transfer pricing systems and be the rea-
son why the headquarters of the company 
should have to intervene in the investment 
activities of the divisions.
The third circumstance is the failures of 
constraint management if two-part trans-
fer pricing is used as shown in situation 3. 
Such failures can be incorrect identification 
of the constraint itself, which can end up in 
rejection of projects that can eliminate the 
actual constraint of the system and increase 
the value of the business. In addition, the 
decisions to increase the amount of the cap-
ital resource that constrains the system op-
eration may be considered as failures if they 
are made before all possible measures have 
been taken to ensure the most effective use 
of this resource. As a result, when the con-
sequences of such a decision are assessed, 
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the base for calculating an increase in cash 
flows due to the adopted projects is under-
estimated, which can lead to overstatement 
of their value and the adoption of projects 
whose NPV is actually negative.
When transfer pricing is decentralized 
and there are internal production resource 
constraints of the system, such dysfunc-
tional decisions can be avoided if there is 
a well-developed intra-company market for 
long-term contracts for the right to use the 
capacity of related divisions. In situation 3, 
division Y could buy back from division Z 
the right to use the missing capacity of unit 
X in the future, reimbursing division Z the 
corresponding part of the transfer payment 
and the profit it did not receive. However, 
if the production structure were more com-
plex, the investment centers might not have 
the information necessary for such optimal 
quasi-market behavior.
It is obvious that the reasonability of us-
ing two-part transfer pricing systems in the 
activities of investment centers can only be 
assessed accurately in each specific case. 
However, as our investigation has shown, 
the risks of losses and lost profits associ-
ated with the use of these systems are ob-
vious while the advantages they may have 
in comparison with centralized management 
are doubtful.
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DISFUNKCIONALNOST DVOSMJERNOG 
ODREĐIVANJA TRANSFERNIH CIJENA U 
ODREĐIVANJU UČINKA INVESTICIJSKIH CENTARA
Sažetak
U ovom se radu raspravlja o mogućnostima sustava dvosmjernog određivanja transfernih cijena 
za poticanje investicijskih centara za odbijanje projekata s pozitivnom neto sadašnjom vrijednošću, 
odnosno prihvaćanje projekata s negativnom neto sadašnjom vrijednošću, u slučaju kada ne postoji 
vanjsko tržište međuproizvoda. Utvrđuje se u kojim uvjetima investicijski centri mogu donositi tako 
disfunkcionalne odluke te se istražuje kako se odgovarajući sustavi mogu modificirati, kako bi se 
uklonili negativni efekti. Za rješavanje navedenih problema, koriste se metode financijske analize, 
teorije realnih opcija i teorije ograničenja te se modelira nekoliko hipotetskih poslovnih situacija, 
kojima se prikazuju posljedice mogućeg disfunkcionalnog ponašanja investicijskih centara, u uvjetima 
decentraliziranog strateškog odlučivanja. U radu se razmatraju razlozi za donošenje ovakvih odluka, 
kao što su korištenje prosječnih stopa troškova resursa u kalkulaciji transfernih plaćanja,  prisustvo 
realnih opcija u povezanim projektima te narušavanje pet koraka fokusiranja u okviru teorije 
ograničenja.
Ključne riječi: transferne cijene, dvosmjerni sustav određivanja transfernih cijena, decentralizacija, 
investicijski centar, ekonomski profit, realna opcija, teorija ograničenja
